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Chapter I: Introduction 
  The Taiwan-China conflict remains one of the most potentially dangerous 
situations in the international system today. A devastating war that would destabilize 
Asia and also relations between the United States and China could occur if the actors 
involved in the situation make radical decisions. Because of the potential severity of the 
conflict, the United States has made the Taiwan-China conflict a priority in its foreign 
policy since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Each of the past three US 
presidents: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama have treated this issue 
delicately in hopes of solving the conflict without provoking a violent confrontation with 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In many ways over the past three administrations 
the foreign policy of the United States towards this issue has stayed relatively the same; 
however there have been notable important changes in the policies between the three 
presidents. The international relations three levels of analysis: individual level, state 
level, and systemic level help explain why this policy has remained the same and why it 
has changed. The individual and systemic factors mostly explain why the policy has 
shifted while the state level and some systemic aspects illustrate the continuities. Of these 
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three levels of analyzes, the most important factors are the economic and military realities 
between the actors, and the influence that the United States military arms corporations 
have on the decision-making process. 
 The three levels of analysis is an important framework for understanding 
international relations issues such as the Taiwan-China conflict, and helps explain why 
there are changes and continuities between presidential administrations. The first part of 
this framework is the individual level of analysis. This level deals with the personality 
and leadership qualities of the individuals who are charged with making the policy 
decisions. The individual level attempts to analyze how their emotions, cognitive skills, 
ambition, ego, and other such factors affect the way they act. The second level of analysis 
is concerned with the state itself and the different factions that act within the state. 
Analysis for this level includes understanding how the different branches of government 
affect each other and also how interest groups affect the decision-making process. The 
final level focuses on the systemic issues of the problem. These include external 
constraints on the actors involved, the realities of the international system, and power 
relationships within the international system.i The three levels of analysis are important in 
understanding the Taiwan-China conflict because it takes an encompassing view on the 
issue. It recognizes that multiple factors on different levels are responsible for the final 
policy outcome. 
 Background Information 
 The Taiwan-China rift began during the Mao Revolution of 1949. During this 
revolution, communists defeated the nationalists and took over the county. After the war, 
Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek took 2 million refugees to Taiwan and vowed to 
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retaliate and take back China. These refugees from China clashed with the local 
population of Taiwan and started to impose to martial law on the island. The United 
States started to support Taiwan after the Korean War when they sent naval ships to 
protect Taiwan and act as a buffer against the expansion of communism. In the 1960s 
because of the rule of the mainland minority, many native Taiwanese started to call for 
independence. Shortly after this time, the United States began to improve relations with 
Mainland China because the US wanted to use China as a means against the Soviet 
Union. As a result the United States severed international ties with Taiwan and took the 
stance of the “One China” policy. However, the United States would continue to 
unofficially sell arms to Taiwan. In 1987, Taiwan officially ended its martial law policy 
and became more democratic.ii On March 23 1996, Taiwan officially had its first 
democratic election.iiiThis transition towards a more democratic regime would have 
important implications for US foreign policy in the area.  
 The issue of Taiwan for the PRC is important both symbolically and politically 
important. One of the focal points of Chinese military development is to attain the ability 
to influence or coerce Taiwan and prevent their independence movement. For China, 
commitment to a modern national-racial identity makes unification an important 
nationalist and psychological goal.iv As of a result of this interest, China has increased its 
military capabilities drastically over the past two decades. China has upgraded its military 
with little help from the United States and many other countries because there are many 
restrictions in the selling of military arms to China after the Tiananmen Square massacre 
in 1989. Despite this, the Chinese have created a large arsenal of short-range missiles that 
are aimed at Taiwan in the hopes that it will influence their decision to not declare formal 
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independence.v China’s aggressive stance towards Taiwan has complicated the issue for 
the United States and has made this situation more volatile for all the actors.   
 The United States has often had conflicting policies in regards to settling the 
situation since 1949. In 1979 the United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA), which mandated that the US sell arms to Taiwan for its defense. However, also in 
1979 the United States and China signed a Joint Communique that restarted diplomatic 
relations between the two countries for the first time since 1949. This remains significant 
in light of the conflict because the US transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to 
Beijing and reiterated the Chinese's "One China" policy.vi On August 17, 1982 another 
important Communique was signed between the US and China that stated the US would 
gradually decrease its selling of arms to Taiwan and that eventually the arms trade would 
end.vii This new treaty was not signed by the US Congress while the TRA was. This has 
caused tension for the US because there are two conflicting treaties regarding the selling 
of arms;viii however the TRA is still fulfilled because the US still sells large amounts of 
military equipment to Taiwan. These treaties and the historical trends in policy towards 
the issue are significant because they have a large impact on the policy options of each 
president.  
 Taiwan and China relations recently have been relatively stable; however there 
have been three major crises between Taiwan and China since 1949. The first crisis 
occurred from August 11, 1954 to May 1, 1955. Following large Taiwanese troop 
movements to Matsu Island and the small islands of Quemoy, China began to bombard 
Quemoy. The United States reacted forcefully in support of Taiwan and even seriously 
considered the use of nuclear weapons against China. After negotiations in April of 1955, 
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the crisis came to halt.ixThis crisis remains significant because it was the first time that 
the US came to the defense of Taiwan. By debating the use of nuclear weapons it 
illustrates the commitment of the US towards Taiwan. This underlining notion of 
defending Taiwan for the US has continued to influence policy for each of the last three 
presidents.  
 The second Taiwan Crisis began in 1958 following the initiation of the “Great 
Leap Forward” by the Chinese Communist Party. This movement shifted China’s foreign 
policy from a “soft” approach to a more “hard” line one in 1958. Starting August 23, 
1958 the Chinese began bombarding Quemoy and Matsu again and they blockaded the 
islands. The United States quickly stated their support of Taiwan once this began. The 
strong US response surprised the Chinese and in September of 1958 diplomatic talks 
began among the actors involved.x The effect that the US response had on the Chinese 
indicates the influence that the US has in the Taiwan-China conflict. The United States’ 
military capabilities acted as a deterrence factor in the second crisis. The US’s ability to 
deter Chinese force has continued to remain vital in US policy towards the Taiwan-China 
conflict. 
The third Taiwan-China Crisis occurred in 1995-96. It demonstrated that the 
conflict could erupt into a deadly conflict even in today’s international system. This crisis 
began when Cornell University invited the President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, to speak 
at the university. President Clinton at first did allow President Lee to visit. However, both 
the United States House of Representatives and the US Senate went against Clinton’s 
decision and overwhelmingly approved a measure to allow Lee to visit.xi The People’s 
Republic of China vehemently disapproved of this visit and accused the United States of 
6 
 
violating the “One China” agreement that had been in place since the 1970s. After the 
visit to Cornell, the US and the PRC opened up a discussion regarding Taiwan once 
again. The negotiations reached a climax when China began military exercises and 
missile tests near Taiwan. The US responded by sending two aircraft carriers to the 
Taiwan Strait. This heated confrontation eventually simmered and the United States and 
the PRC began to have normal negotiations.xii This potential crisis exhibits the notion 
that two of the most powerful countries in the world could engage in a violent conflict, 
and that each president must cautiously implement policies to maintain the status quo. 
Literary Review 
  Many articles were written as an attempt to explain the policy of each US 
president towards Taiwan and China, but these articles do not attempt to understand how 
the policy was constructed on all three of the levels of analysis. These articles help 
highlight the important factors that contribute to why the United States has acted the way 
it has in regards to the Taiwan-China conflict; however, few if any article have explicitly 
examined the changes and continuities between the past three US presidents. Much of the 
literature also does not directly examine how the different levels of analysis relate to each 
other, and usually they just study one or two aspects of the problem. The consistencies 
and changes between administrations occur because of factors in each level of analysis. 
The changes between the past three administrations is also important in understanding the 
aspects of the policy that will likely persist and which aspects are subject to change when 
the next administration comes into power. Thus, using a three level analysis framework 
when examining this issue is vital to properly understand the actions of the United States.  
   A couple of articles examine the personality and leadership qualities of the 
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president and their impact on policy in general. These scholarly articles attempt to 
understand the correlation between the foreign policy of each president and their 
individual traits. These articles do not talk directly about each president’s personality and 
its impact on the policy towards Taiwan. They just offer important insights into how each 
president conducts general foreign policy. For example, Jason Berggren and Nicol C. Rae 
state President George W. Bush had strong religious and moral convictions that were 
influential in his foreign policy decisions.xiii David Frum, President Bush’s former 
speechwriter, also explains how Bush’s religious and moral beliefs affected his 
presidency when he said Bush was on a Crusade that was about good vs. evil. There was 
also the popular view that Bush set out to make the world safe for democracy similar to 
Wilson did in his presidency.xiv President Bush was not an realist and instead embraced a 
Wilsonian-based ideological foreign policy.xv This remains important especially when 
one examines the nature of the conflict between the democratic Taiwan and the more 
authoritative government of China. As for Clinton, Michael Lyons describes how 
president’s high ambition, indecisiveness, and flexibility were important components in 
the formulation of his general foreign policy.xvi There is not as much literature on 
President Obama’s personality because he has only been in office for just under two 
years, however his character traits still play an important role in how he conducts foreign 
policy. Richard Cohen talks how Obama is more of a realist in his policy decisions,xvii 
and Donald Douglas describes how his patience and pragmatic standpoint towards the 
international system have had an important impact on his foreign policy.xviii The 
personality traits of each president and how they individually conduct foreign policy is 
vital in further understanding their approach to the Taiwan-China conflict.  
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  There are also a number of illuminating articles that describe how many state-
level factors contribute to the US foreign policy towards Taiwan. Graham Allison helps 
to explain the structural dynamics of the decision-making process and its impact on the 
final outcome for a particular policy. He talks about how the government is not fully 
informed, centrally controlled, and value-maximizing. Instead the government is made up 
of a conglomerate of semi-feudal organizations whose final outcome on a policy can be 
properly realized by understanding their standard behavior.xix This complex structural 
nature of decision-making has a substantial impact on the formulation of policy towards 
Taiwan. Although the President has the most authority in regards to the final outcome, 
other organizations such as Congress, lobbyists, and the military industrial complex play 
a vital role in shaping the President's final decision.  
Graham Allison's third model of analysis also helps explain why the structural 
aspects are significant. He talks about how the decision-makers for a particular policy are 
not a monolithic group, but instead consist of a number of actors engaging in a 
competitive political game. The final outcome for a decision is the result of compromises 
made between the many actors involved.xx This relationship described by Allison helps 
explain why Congress plays an important constraining role in the formulation of policy 
towards Taiwan.  
  There are also other sources that detail the impact that state-level aspects have on 
policy. One book written by retired Congressman Lee Hamilton illustrates how the 
foreign policy decision-making process has become politicized, and he also talks about 
how compromises between the US Congress and the Executive Branch are necessary in 
the construction of foreign policy.xxi Other articles and US Congress bills help to 
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illustrate how the actions of the Congress inhibit or allow the president to conduct the 
foreign policy he wants. One article by Jiemian Yang illustrates this by describing how 
the number of bills that Congress passes affects the foreign policy towards Taiwan. This 
article also points out that the domestic interest in the issue plays a role in determining 
the policy towards Taiwan, and that military lobbyists plays an important role in 
determining the foreign policy too. xxii Another article by Joshua Su-Ya Wu extends on 
this interest group factor and finds that the impact of Taiwan lobbyists in the US 
Congress is immense and substantial.xxiii These articles are correct in understanding that 
the military industrial complex and other lobbyist groups play a part in the formulation of 
policy towards Taiwan, however they do not fully recognize the extent to which this is 
true. 
  Other articles have elaborated on the impact that the military industrial complex 
has on formulating US policy, but they vary on the degree in which this is true. A couple 
of the articles by Henry Rosemont and James Nolt talk about how policymakers in the 
United States have over-hyped the China threat in order to spend more on the military.xxiv 
xxv  There are also some articles that describe the relationship between military arms 
corporations donating money to Congress and the impact that it has on passing bills in 
favor of increased relations with countries that will buy arms from the US. Richard 
Fleisher examines PAC donations by Defense contractors and their impact on creating 
policies that are favorable to their interests, such as selling military arms to Taiwan.xxvi 
Some political observers, such as Jiemian believe that the military industrial complex has 
been influential in all administrations, but under President Bush this influence has been 
even greater.xxvii Some articles reject the notion that the military industrial complex plays 
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a large role in policy formulation. Andrew Kennedy writes about how military interest 
groups do not significantly affect policy towards Taiwan. The author believes that the 
stakes are too risky in this conflict for the United States to be persuaded by the economic 
benefits of the military contractors.xxviii These articles that deal with US military 
contractors make important arguments about the impact that they have. However, they do 
not place this issue in the context of all three levels of analysis as an attempt to 
understand the changes and continuities between Clinton, Bush, and Obama.  
  Systemic level factors also play an important role in policy formulation, and there 
are a couple of articles that attempt to understand their impact. One article from the 
Heritage Foundation by Peter Brookes describes how the United States supports Taiwan 
because it has a greater agenda of promoting democracy in the region.xxix Andrew 
Kennedy’s article expands upon this and offers even more explanations for why the 
United States risks a catastrophic war with China over Taiwan. These reasons include: 
the “nervous” hegemon theory that states the US is using the Taiwan conflict to combat 
China’s rising superiority, and the “entangled” ally theory, which states the US is 
supporting Taiwan so they do not lose face by abandoning a longstanding ally.xxx These 
explanations offer valuable insights into the ideology of US foreign policy; however they 
do not examine the impact that state-level and individual-level factors have on the 
responses of the US towards Taiwan.   
  Scholarly writings also detail the external constraints that affect the United States 
ability to conduct foreign policy. The Defense Department released a report in 2010 that 
detailed the rise of China’s military and the impact that this has on the Taiwan-China 
conflict. Due to China having a greater military capabilities recently, the United States 
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cannot antagonize or be too aggressive with China because they risk escalating the 
conflict into a violent war.xxxi Military capabilities are not the only systemic constraint on 
the US’s policy towards Taiwan. The economic reality of the two countries is also 
important in understanding why the US has often remained cautious in the conflict. Keith 
Bradsher details how the massive trade imbalance between the United States and China 
has made the two countries reliant on each other economically. As a result of this, the 
United States is constrained by the possibility of an economic backlash if they act too 
drastically in regards to the Taiwan-China conflict.xxxii  
  The terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001 and its role in changing of policies 
towards Taiwan has also been examined by scholars. One article describes how the 
United States following September 11th did not want the Taiwan conflict to become a 
major issue because the leaders of the US were more concerned with combating 
terrorism. Jiemian Yang talks about how the US took a softer approach towards China on 
the issue in order to appeal for support for terrorism related issues such as Iran and North 
Korea.xxxiii The United States cannot afford to make this issue too volatile because they 
have other military priorities. The reality of the post-September 11 international system 
has had important implications towards changing the policy towards Taiwan and China.  
Chapter II: The Policies of the three Presidents 
President Bill Clinton’s Policy towards the Taiwan-China Conflict 
 When President Clinton took power in 1993, he approached the Taiwan-China 
conflict carefully and cautiously. President Clinton used “strategic ambiguity” in his 
position towards defending Taiwan.xxxiv This meant that Clinton never explicitly stated 
the extent to which the United States would respond if China tried to forcefully take over 
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Taiwan. Clinton also instituted the "Three Noes" policy in which the US would not 
advocate for a Taiwanese independence movement, a One China, one Taiwan policy, nor 
would the US lobby for Taiwan to join the UN.xxxv Despite this policy the Clinton 
administration still continued the longstanding policy of selling military products to 
Taiwan. During Clinton’s presidency, there was even an increase in selling military arms 
to Taiwan from previous administrations.xxxvi Clinton also utilized an engagement 
oriented diplomatic strategy in regards to dealing with China and the Taiwan issue.xxxvii 
As mentioned before, Clinton did however try to appease the Chinese government by not 
allowing President Lee to visit Cornell, which showed that his administration’s policy 
towards Taiwan and China was one of retaining the status quo. Clinton did not want to 
antagonize China and tried to maintain the policy of “One China”. However, once 
Congress voted against Clinton’s position and China responded to President Lee’s visit 
by having military exercises near Taiwan, Clinton reacted forcefully by deploying naval 
ships. This action shows that Clinton wanted to maintain the “One China” policy, yet he 
still was willing to risk a potential war to protect Taiwan.  
 President Bush’s Policies Toward Taiwan and China 
 President George W. Bush notably both continued and changed US policy 
towards Taiwan and China from the Clinton administration. During the 2000 election 
Bush campaigned that he would approach the situation differently than his predecessor, 
Clinton. President Bush wanted to take a tougher stance on China and make his 
commitment to Taiwan explicit. While President Clinton favored “strategic ambuigity, 
President Bush’s policy centered on “strategic clarity”. This is exemplified in Bush’s 
official stance on China and Taiwan during his election campaign, which stated:  
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“Our policy is based on the principle that there must be no use of force by China 
against Taiwan. We deny the right of Beijing to impose its rule on the free 
Taiwanese people. All issues regarding Taiwan's future must be resolved 
peacefully and must be agreeable to the people of Taiwan. If China violates these 
principles and attacks Taiwan, then the United States will respond appropriately 
in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. America will help Taiwan defend 
itself."xxxviii  
President Bush in 2002 even met with the Defense Minister of Taiwan for the first time 
since 1979 signifying a change in attitude on the part of the US. President Bush also tried 
to spur Taiwan to upgrade their military and defense infrastructures in anticipation of a 
potential Chinese attack. These events and statements illustrate a change in policy over 
Taiwan with President Bush, but this strong support for Taiwan would wane over the 
course of Bush’s presidency. 
 As Bush’s presidency progressed, he realized that a strong stance on China in the 
Taiwan conflict would not have the results he desired at the beginning of his presidency. 
Events such as the attacks on September 11th and the continuing economic rise of China 
were major factors in this change in course. President Bush realized that an unstable 
Taiwan was not in his best interests regarding foreign policy considering the new 
enemies that the United States was facing. Thus he lessened his stance on Taiwan; 
however, this stance was still strong compared to President Clinton. Bush still proceeded 
with his plans of a missile defense system around China and included Taiwan in the 
strategy. A number of factors in each level of analysis can help explain the similarities 
and changes between the presidencies of Clinton and Bush. 
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President Obama’s Policies Towards Taiwan and China 
  President Barack Obama approached the Taiwan-China conflict in many of the 
same ways as President Bush, albeit with a few exceptions. Before continuing on with 
President Obama's approach, one must note that Obama's presidency is still relatively 
new, and as a result his policy towards Taiwan and China is still subject to change. 
Despite this, Obama has still made some key decisions regarding the issue that help 
illustrate his policy. Similar to the preceding presidents, Barack Obama renewed the arms 
deal for Taiwan of President Bush's presidency to the dismay of the PRC. Barack Obama 
has also been hard-nosed on China and has tried to use this strategy to maintain stability 
in the region. Barack Obama has not been shy to criticize China for its actions in the 
conflict, such as its recent military buildup.xxxix Obama has also continued the policy of 
upholding the "One China" policy. This is exemplified when President Obama stated in 
2009 that: "I have been clear in the past that my administration fully supports a one-
China policy… We don't want to change that policy and that approach."xl Obama has also 
continued the trend from the later parts of Bush's presidency by trying to engage China 
and establish a constructive and stable relationship.xli Campaign promises are never fully 
indicative of how the president will act when in office; however Obama's statements 
during his election campaign could help highlight what his future plans might consist of. 
During the election, Obama promised to find a peaceful solution for the China-Taiwan 
conflict, increase military-military relations with China, increase transparency with 
China, and try to ensure that China follows human rights standards.xlii Barack Obama's 
statements and policies towards China and the Taiwan issue indicate that his position has 
not strayed far from Bush. 
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Chapter III: Individual-level Factors 
Individual level factors are important in highlighting how changes in general 
policy towards Taiwan and China came about but they are not as affective in 
understanding the continuities. The leadership styles of each president have played a role 
in formulating policy towards Taiwan. Since the leadership styles of Clinton and Bush, 
and then Bush and Obama are different, it helps explain why changes in policy occurred. 
The discrepancies of the three presidents stemming from foreign policy ideology and 
moral outlook on the international system affected their overarching strategy towards 
Taiwan and China. Some leadership aspects of the three presidents do account for several 
of the continuities, but it is not as prominent.  
Individual-level Factors and Clinton   
There are a number of leadership characteristics and personality traits of Clinton 
that could help one understand his policy towards Taiwan and China. One of his 
significant personality traits was ambition, which played an underlining role in 
formulating his sometimes risky foreign policy towards Taiwan and China. Both on the 
campaign trail and during his two terms in office Clinton was considered ambitious. This 
high ambition and determination led Clinton to gamble more in his policies.xliii  This 
tendency helps explain Clinton’s actions during the Taiwan-China Crisis of 1995-1996. 
The placement of US naval ships in the Taiwan Strait following the military exercises of 
China constitutes a foreign policy gamble. In the international system, deploying military 
ships in a region to counteract another actor’s military could potentially develop into a 
violent encounter. President Clinton was willing to make this gamble because he wanted 
to clearly exhibit his administration’s desire to protect Taiwan from Chinese aggression. 
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His actions demonstrate ambition in his desire to protect Taiwan and his willingness to 
risk a violent conflict to do so. Therefore, President Clinton’s ambition and risky nature 
help explain his policy towards Taiwan and China.  
President Clinton’s flexibility and openness to alternate interpretations also play 
an underlining role in explaining the actions of his administrations towards Taiwan and 
China. Psychological tests have been tried on Clinton that indicates that he seeks personal 
approval and that he also seeks flexibility. xliv Clinton’s flexible nature explains his 
willingness to change his strategy towards China and Taiwan. After the 1995-1996 Crisis, 
President Clinton changed his overarching strategy towards the situation. He began to 
implement a “comprehensive engagement” policy to form a “constructive strategic 
partnership” with China.xlv Clinton’s openness to change likely made this policy 
transition easier. Thus his personality and leadership traits played a role in the overall 
development of his policy towards Taiwan and China. 
 President Clinton’s ideology, or lack thereof, is also important in understanding 
his overarching Taiwan-China policy. Clinton believes that ideology can be dangerous 
because it prevents one from changing their actions. This is exemplified during his 
speech at the American Center for Progress: “The problem with ideology is, if you’ve got 
an ideology, you’ve already got your mind made up. You know all the answers, and that 
makes evidence irrelevant and arguments a waste of time”.xlvi His views on not using an 
ideological basis for policy extend into his decision-making process for Taiwan and 
China. President Clinton did not have a clear and decisive overarching foreign policy 
theory, nor does he have a moralist outlook on the international system like that of 
President Bush Jr., which will be shown later. Not having a definitive foreign policy 
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view, President Clinton is not restricted in what he can do. Along with his flexible nature, 
this helps explain his willingness to change course on an issue such as Taiwan.   
Individual-level Factors and Bush 
President Bush’s personality and leadership traits have had a significant impact on 
why he has notably changed some aspects of the overall direction of US policy towards 
Taiwan from Clinton. One of the most significant traits of Bush was his moral and 
religious outlook on foreign policy, which helps explain the change in an overarching 
strategy from Clinton. President Bush was an evangelical Christian and his religion 
affected the way he viewed global conflicts.xlvii President Bush saw Taiwan and its 
democracy as the “good” country that needed protection from the authoritative China. 
This explanation is simplified; however it still helps illustrate why President Bush 
differed from President Clinton. Bush took a stronger stance on defending Taiwan 
because his religious and moral convictions influenced his foreign policy decisions. 
Although the former President changed his stance and became softer on the Taiwan-
China conflict as his presidency progressed, he still viewed the conflict through a 
religious and moral lens. The president had to take a softer stance because he needed the 
support of China to combat an enemy more dangerous to the international system: 
terrorism. Therefore, his religious and moral view on foreign policy significantly 
impacted his decision-making process in regards to the Taiwan-China conflict. 
  President Bush’s hawkish nature also had a large influenced on his approach 
towards the conflict and why his policies changed from Clinton. President Bush has often 
been considered a part of the conservative right. This conservative right is more hawkish 
and still has a Cold War mentality on foreign policy decisions. President Bush’s 
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administration viewed China through a prism of ideology as the inevitable enemy similar 
to the Soviet Union. xlviii This Cold-War mentality helps illuminate Bush’s tough stance 
on China. Since the Bush administration had a Cold War mentality in regards to China, it 
follows that many of the policies would mirror those used against the Russians. Like with 
Russia, the United States wanted to have a strong stance that prevented any action that 
would try and impede upon a democratic state. Thus, Bush's firm policy towards China is 
partially a result of his administration's hawkish perception of the international system.    
Individual-level Factors and Obama  
Obama had a different leadership style than Bush, but unlike how the differences 
between Bush and Clinton led to changes, Obama’s style has allowed his administration 
to follow the policies of Bush. Barack Obama’s pragmatist approach for his foreign 
policy helps explain why he was willing to continue the policies of Bush.xlix Obama has 
not followed in the footsteps of Bush and based his foreign policy on ideology and 
morality. Although this distinction between the two presidents would likely lead one to 
believe that Obama would change his policy towards Taiwan and China, his pragmatic 
view of the international system in fact leads him to continue Bush's policies. There are 
many complex dimensions to the Taiwan-China conflict, and although Bush had an 
ideological basis for his decisions, Obama still follows Bush's policies because a stable 
Taiwan-China relationship is important for the United States. A radical shift in emphasis 
could create undesirable instabilities. Obama understands that one cannot antagonize 
China too much and risk an unstable relationship considering the economic and potential 
violent consequences. By following in the footsteps of Bush, Obama shows that he 
understands that a Taiwan policy must support the Taiwanese, but also at the same time 
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not anger the Chinese to a certain point. Therefore, Obama's stance on Taiwan and China 
can be directly related to his pragmatic leadership style.  
  Another key aspect of President Obama's personality and leadership style is his 
flexibility in his decision-making process, which helps explain his willingness to follow 
Bush’s policies. Obama is similar to Clinton in that both are open to diverse viewpoints 
and willing to listen when in the decision-making process.l In the same way that Clinton's 
flexibility affected his decisions towards Taiwan, Obama's flexibility has influenced the 
final policy towards the issue. Obama campaigned on the basis that he would 
fundamentally change from the Bush administration the way the United States interacted 
with the world. This has been true for a number of foreign policy issues, however as 
mentioned before Obama has often continued many of the policies of Bush in regards to 
Taiwan. The strategy towards the conflict that Obama inherited was largely enacted by 
Republican conservatives who do not share the same foreign policy philosophy as 
Obama. However, Obama still proceeded and continued with Bush's policy. Obama was 
willing to take into account viewpoints from the opposite political spectrum. Therefore, 
by following policies from the opposing political party, Obama illustrates that his 
flexibility influences his decisions regarding the Taiwan and China conflict. 
Chapter IV: State-Level Factors  
  There are also structural aspects of the decision-making process that contribute to 
the continuity between the presidents. Presidents do not possess a unitary ability to 
formulate foreign policy. Congress and interest groups play a role in the final policy. 
These structural aspects have varying degrees of influence with military arms interest 
groups having the most influence of the structural aspects. Congress has a large impact as 
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well, but it can only make significant decisions in special cases and usually can only 
marginally affect the overall policy towards Taiwan. Lobbyists have the least amount of 
significance because they cannot dictate policy, but can only raise awareness and try to 
influence Congress.  
Executive vs. Legislative Branch  
The structural aspect pertaining to the relationship between the executive branch 
and legislative branch is important in understanding many of the continuities between the 
three presidents. In creating foreign policy, the government can respond to foreign 
events. Technically the United States Congress must approve a measure that is in 
response to an international situation but most of the time it follows the president lead. 
The executive branch can also make policy statements regarding an issue, negotiate an 
international agreement, and propose legislation for Congress to approve. However, 
despite the power that the President wields, the legislative branch has a lot of input in the 
foreign policy process. Congress can enact resolutions and policy statements, legislative 
directives, legislative restrictions/funding denials, informal advice and congressional 
oversight. Congress does not wield as much power as the executive branch in the 
decision making process, however they are able to slightly change the President's foreign 
policy.li Congress is also vital in understanding the policy decisions of the president 
because the executive branch does not solely dictate the final outcome of policy. As such, 
Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have all had to deal and make compromises with 
the US Congress in orchestrating a successful policy towards Taiwan and China. Thus by 
understanding the intentions and role of Congress in each of these administrations, one 
can further grasp how the changes and continuity between presidents came about.  
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  The United States Congress throughout all three administrations has played an 
important role in maintaining an overall pro-Taiwan policy. The United States Congress 
has consistently been one of Taiwan's greatest supporters.lii Congress has favored the 
Taiwanese over the Chinese for a number of reasons that involve the military industrial 
complex and lobbyists. There are also ideological reasons for their support with the main 
one being that Congress sympathizes with Taiwan due to shared democratic and human 
rights values.liii Unlike many other issues, the Taiwan conflict does not generate intense 
partisan divide within Congress; instead most Democrats and Republicans support 
Taiwan over China. This sentiment towards Taiwan is important in understanding how 
each presidential administration is constrained by Congress. All three presidents must 
accommodate this in their foreign policy. Thus this constraining factor partially explains 
continuity between the past three presidents in regards to supporting Taiwan. 
  The United States Congress has played an important constraining role in President 
Clinton's administration's policy towards the Taiwan conflict. One of the main examples 
of this influence has been mentioned earlier. This pertains to how the US Congress 
overwhelmingly approved Taiwan’s President Lee visit. President Clinton's 
administration initial policy of disallowing the president to visit was a function of Clinton 
trying to uphold the status quo and avoid antagonizing China. Since the President could 
not ignore Congress's actions, he had to significantly alter his policy towards the issue of 
the visiting President Lee. Again as mentioned before, this had significant consequences. 
As such, even though the Clinton administration knew that a visit by the Taiwanese 
President could destabilize the conflict, the President had little to no choice on the matter. 
Therefore, this exemplifies that Congress for better or for worse has an enormous impact 
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on the decision-making process in the Taiwan-China issue.  
  During Clinton's presidency, Congress also enacted other measures that tried to 
force the administration to further support Taiwan's position. In 2000, members of the 
House of Representatives passed a resolution, which was named the Taiwan Security 
Enhancement, which called for the administration to more clearly follow the Taiwan 
Relations Act. This resolution was adamantly opposed by the Clinton Administration. 
However, the Senate never took this bill up and as a result it only remained a House 
Resolution.liv This resolution could not have the desired results of affecting foreign policy 
because both Houses of Congress did not pass the bill. This failed resolution illustrates 
that although Congress typically supports Taiwan more than the President, the internal 
system and rules of Congress sometimes prevents itself from enacting the desired policy. 
Therefore after examining some of Congress's actions during the Clinton administration, 
one realizes that Congress has had some success in forcing the president's policy to 
become more pro-Taiwan; however, Congress cannot always influence the President's 
decisions in regards to Taiwan and China. 
  During President Bush's presidency, Congress also played a similar role from that 
of the Clinton's administration in the Taiwan-China policy construction, which helps 
explain many of the continuities between the two administrations. Between 2002-2006 
there were twenty-four different Taiwan-related legislations introduced on the House 
floor. From all 50 states, there were a total of 547 cosponsors with about an average of 23 
co-sponsors per resolution. Almost all of these measures also passed unanimously too.lv 
Again this shows that Congress continued its strong support of Taiwan during the Bush's 
administration. Although President Bush had a strong relationship with Taiwan, he was 
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still limited in his policy options due to Congress. Therefore, part of the continuity for the 
strong support towards Taiwan between the Clinton and Bush administrations can be 
partially attributed to the power relationship between the Executive and Legislative 
branches, and the measures that the latter branch enacted. 
During Obama's administration, the United States Congress has also further 
continued the trend of ensuring that president remains supportive of Taiwan. The Obama 
administration has only been in office for one Congressional session, the 111th session, 
yet there has still been some notable Congressional measures. These include 
H.CON.RES.18, which centers around allowing improving Taiwan relations and trying to 
help them become an official statelvi and H.CON.RES.200 which condemns China for 
placing ballistic missiles pointing at Taiwan.lvii These two resolutions illustrate that 
Congress's tendency to favor Taiwan has not waned since the Clinton administration. 
Another notable aspect of these two resolutions is that H.CON.RES.18 has mostly 
republican cosigners while H.CON.RES.2000 has mostly democratic cosigners. This 
helps exhibit the notion that the Taiwan conflict does not have a deeply politicized 
partisan divide within Congress like many other foreign and domestic issues. Similar to 
the previous two administrations, these Congressional responses to the conflict limit and 
influence the potential policy decisions that President Obama can undertake. Obama does 
not always need to follow the stances of Congress but they ensure, like they did with 
Clinton and Bush, that he cannot stray too far from a pro-Taiwan position. 
Lobbyists and Their Influence 
Taiwan and China lobbyists have played a role in both the continuation and 
changes in final policy of each of the three presidents, however this influence is marginal 
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and not as significant as other structural aspects. Each lobbyist group tries to influence 
both the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch; however they have more impact 
on the Legislative Branch. Interest groups for Taiwan and China try to raise awareness 
and spend money in hopes of swaying members of the decision-making process to 
endorse their position. Taiwanese lobbyists want Congress to continue their longstanding 
pro-Taiwan policy while Chinese lobbyists have tried to undermine this support. Over the 
past three administrations Taiwanese lobbyists have been vastly more influential than 
Chinese lobbyists over the issue; however the Taiwan lobbyists have lost some of the 
power since the beginning of the Clinton administration, and as such their significance in 
continuing a pro-Taiwan policy has diminished.   
During the Clinton Administration, Taiwan related lobbyists had their highest 
degree of influence among the three presidents on United States policy towards the 
conflict. Taiwan lobbyists, from the grassroots up to the official Taiwan diplomats, have 
usually been influential in helping shape a sympathetic Taiwan policy.lviii During the 
Clinton administration, this remained evident. Taiwan lobbying during the Clinton 
administration followed the historical trend of such lobbyists being strong, robust, and 
having lots of influence.lix They had a unified position in which to try and rally support 
among members of Congress, which allowed them to have more success. They spent 
money and raised awareness among the members of Congress, which then helped gain 
them support. 
  Because Taiwan had such a large influence in American politics, China during 
Clinton's administration sought to generate greater influence within Congress and the 
American public. This change in emphasis on the part of China occurred after the Taiwan 
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Crisis of 1995-96, when they realized the impact that Taiwan had on US domestic 
politics.lx This was called the "China Plan" but it proved controversial because there were 
allegations that there was illegal trading of secrets and funds in order to implement this 
plan. There was even allegations that this controversy might have even affected the 
presidential race that year in which Clinton won re-election. This was proven to be false 
and the verdict regarding the presidential election was that this controversy had minimal 
significance during the election.lxi However, because of the scandal that followed the 
"China Plan", the Chinese lobbyists failed to achieve its goal of generating greater 
support for China. It most likely only further strengthened the opposition towards China 
within the American public and Congress. Thus, because of the negative publicity of 
Chinese lobbyists and the large positive impact of lobbyists pertaining to Taiwan, 
lobbyists had an important influence on domestic and Congressional perceptions and 
views during the Clinton Administration. Therefore, since as mentioned before pro-
Taiwan sentiment within Congress has a role in shaping foreign policy, Clinton's pro-
Taiwan strategy can be partially explained by the role of lobbyists.  
  During the Bush administration lobbyists would continue to have a marginal 
impact on continuing the pro-Taiwan policy; however this influence diminished 
compared to the Clinton administration. One of the main reasons for this decrease in 
sway among lobbyists pertains to the democratization and increased pluralism of Taiwan. 
Once Taiwan started holding democratic elections, the KMT "machine" that used to 
lobby on behalf of a unified stance for Taiwan eroded due to the presence of other 
political parties. Now there many Taiwan messages and some congressional observers 
believe that this lack of a unified message has diminished the lobbyists influence in 
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Congress.lxii This erosion of the KMT "machine" began during the Clinton administration 
it became more significant after the 2000 election, right before Bush came into power. 
This erosion became magnified because the main lobbyist organization in the US: Taipei 
Economic Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) lost much of its support from 
Taiwanese government. The new DPP government at the time did not trust TECRO 
because of its previous ties with the KMT party, and as such the clout that the lobbying 
group once had diminished.lxiii Because of this reduced influence on the part of lobbyists 
during the Bush administration, the president did not face the same external pressures that 
President Clinton faced during his presidency. As a result, during the later years of his 
presidency, Bush could more easily take a more conciliatory stance towards China in 
regards to the conflict.  
  Lobbyists still marginally helped maintain the pro-Taiwan policy from Bush to 
Obama. The trend of Taiwan supporting Political Action Committee (PAC) donations to 
members of Congress has continued relatively the same going into the Obama 
administration.lxiv The amount of money spent by the main Taiwan related PAC has not 
significantly changed since the presidency of George Bush. This helps illustrates that 
lobbying firms in favor of Taiwan have not significantly changed their behavior in the 
advent of a new president, and as such they have continued the process of raising 
awareness and spending money to influence congressional votes. Since their behavior 
between the two presidents has stayed relatively the same, it follows that their limited 
influence on continuing a pro-Taiwan policy has remained unchanged. 
Military Industrial Complex  
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The military industrial complex has played a substantial role in continuing the 
pro-Taiwan policy of each president. Taiwan is currently the top Asian buyer of United 
States military equipment.lxv Since the United States has obliged to sell military arms to 
Taiwan, many military arms corporations have become involved with ensuring the 
continuation of such a policy. Military arms corporations like to sell to Taiwan because 
they possess a large foreign currency reserve to spend without the need of US 
government credit or loans from plans like the Foreign Military Finance Program.lxvi This 
advantage for the military industrial complex has resulted in the industry donating 
massive amounts of money to Congress, and it has allowed many in the industry to 
become involved in the decision-making process to try and influence a financially 
favorable Taiwan policy. They have been successful in influencing an advantageous 
policy and as a result they have had a profound impact on why all three presidents have 
continued the policy of ensuring the selling of arms to Taiwan even in the face of intense 
opposition from China. 
  The military contractors also have pro-Taiwan sentiment because there are many 
limitations to selling to China. After the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989 the United States 
along with many other countries stopped selling military equipment to China. The US has 
recently begun to sell military to China again, but the United States still drastically 
outsells equipment to Taiwan than to China.lxvii This difference helps explain why 
contractors in the United States are much more inclined to try and influence a pro-Taiwan 
policy than a pro-China policy. 
  The military industrial complex is important to each of the presidential 
administrations and Congress for a number of reasons. Economically, military contractors 
28 
 
provide thousands of jobs and revenue. For many members of Congress who have 
military factories in this district, the demands of the military contractors ar
seriously. International agreements for trading of arms are also crucial in maintaining 
these contractors financially especially when one recognizes that the domestic demand 
for military equipment has recently decreased
the United States because it helps balance the trade deficit with m
Taiwan.lxix Because of the benefits that these contractors provide, they are able to 
influence policy in many substantial ways.
  Two of the major militar
significant contributions in order to dictate a pro
sale, the Executive Branch along with the United States Congress must approve the 
measure according to the Const
Congress from military corporations like Lockheed and Boeing 
on the final outcome of an arms policy towards Taiwan. Their contributions are shown in 
the graphs below.   
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Graph 2.0 
 
As shown above in Graphs 1.0 and 2.0,
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  The military industrial complex is also influential in continuing the policies 
between the three presidents because of the connections within the bureaucracy of the 
decision-making process. Lockheed Martin and Boeing are part of the United States State 
Department's International Security Advisory Board.lxxiv This interconnection between 
the top two military contractors and an important foreign policy bureaucratic organization 
only furthers the point that these corporations have a large amount of input in the US's 
policies towards Taiwan. Some such as the Director at the Center of Public Integrity 
argue: "the defense industry is one of the major industries that enjoys close ties with the 
US government".lxxv These close ties between the military industrial complex and the 
government indicate that contractors have a significant degree of influence in the 
formulation of policy. Thus this high degree of influence helps explain the continuities in 
arms deals with Taiwan for the last three presidents.  
  President Clinton's administration was affected by the lobbying and donation 
efforts of the military industrial complex. As mentioned before Clinton continued the 
trend of adhering to the TRA and selling weapons to Taiwan. There is even the view that 
Clinton was more receptive to selling arms to Taiwan than his predecessors; however he 
refused to sell items that were not necessary to security, such as diesel submarines and 
electronic war systems for frigates.lxxvi Clinton wanted to uphold the TRA, but at the 
same time he did not want the Chinese to feel too anxious regarding the buildup of 
Taiwan. If one examines Graphs 1.0 and 2.0, it is evident that for both contractors 1996 
and 1998 signified an increase in efforts. This increase likely correlates to the next graph 
where the US dramatically increased their arms dealings to Taiwan. 
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Graph 3.0 lxxvii 
 
This correlation between the lobbying efforts of Boeing and Lockheed, and the steep 
increase in US arms sales to Taiwan is clearly causal. An arms deal to Taiwan is a major 
source of revenue for military contractors and as a result their efforts to dictate policy are 
highly likely to increase. Because of this the US Congress is more likely to advocate and 
sign for a larger deal. As a result President Clinton's policy towards the Taiwan-China 
conflict becomes more pro-Taiwan.  
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and it is likely that this is no coincidence with the arms deal that President Bush agreed 
on in 2001 with Taiwan. One must note that these spikes in money spent could also be 
attributed to other reasons such as the competition for the right to construct the new Joint 
Strike Fighter Program in 2001.lxxviii However, despite this these numbers still help 
illustrate that lobbying for military contractors increases in the period leading up to an 
arms deal with Taiwan. Also, as indicated in Graphs 1.0 and 2.0, in 2004-2006 there is a 
high level of lobbying efforts for Boeing while there is an increase in lobbying efforts for 
Lockheed. This correlates to an increase in arms dealing with Taiwan of 2004-2006 as 
illustrated in Graph 3.0. During this period Taiwan was actually the leading arms trade 
partner with the US, which helps further the point that military lobbyists had a large 
impact on US arms policy towards Taiwan. Therefore, this helps explain the continuities 
between the two presidents pro-Taiwan policy regarding military arms deals towards 
Taiwan.  
 Connections among members of the Bush administration and military contractors 
also help illustrate the continuities between Bush and Clinton. Two of the more notable 
examples of interconnection between military contractors and the US government during 
the presidency of Bush include United States Vice President Dick Cheney's ties with 
Lockheed Martin and the vice president of Lockheed Martin during Bush's 
administration. The Vice President in Bush’s administration, Dick Cheney, had ties to 
Lockheed Martin because his wife served on the board from 1995 until his inauguration 
in 2001. The vice president of Lockheed Martin, Bruce Jackson, during the Bush 
administration was also a financial chair and fundraiser for Bush's 2000 campaign.lxxix 
These two examples illustrate that during the Bush administration there were some 
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notable conflict of interests regarding the government and contractors. This high-profile 
connectivity helps further explain Bush's pro-Taiwan stance regarding arms trade even in 
the face of trying to engage China.  
  Military contractors have also had a significant impact on the formulation of arms 
trade policy in Barack Obama's administration, and as a result it helps explain why 
continuities exist between Obama and Bush. During Obama’s administration there has 
been a drastic increase in spending by the lobbyists. The graphs 1.0 and 2.0 indicate this 
sharp increase in 2008-09. This phenomenon likely correlates to the debate regarding a 
new massive arms deal that Obama signed in the beginning of 2010. This arm deals states 
the United States will sell $6.4 billion worth of military equipment, including missiles, 
advanced communication systems, naval ships, and helicopters to Taiwan.lxxx This move 
greatly angered the Chinese yet the United States still went through with deal. The large 
spike mentioned earlier in spending by Boeing and Lockheed are likely partially 
responsible for this massive arms deal. The two corporations also might have decided to 
devote greater resources to this undertaking because the United States has recently begun 
to scale back its military operations in Iraq. This scale back results in a loss of revenue 
for these corporations and as such they likely realized that a substantial arms deal with 
Taiwan could help them recover from their expected losses. Therefore, the continuation 
between President Bush and Obama regarding an arms deal with Taiwan even when the 
two are trying to engage China can be attributed to the large influence that the military 
industrial complex has on the government's decision-making process.  
Chapter V: Systemic-level Factors 
  For each presidential administration, systemic factors of the international order 
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have played a significant role in shaping their foreign policy towards Taiwan. Systemic 
factors account for both changes and continuities in policies between the three presidents, 
however they have had a greater impact on the changes. These factors include the impact 
of the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, the politics of Taiwan and China, and 
power relations between the United States and China. Because of these factors, the three 
presidents often have to rationally limit their options in regards to the Taiwan conflict. 
Each of these systemic factors has undergone some form of change from the dawn of the 
Clinton presidency to present day. As such, by understanding the changing nature of the 
systemic factors, one understands that these factors play an important role in the 
continuities and changes between the presidential administrations. 
The Impact of the September 11th Attacks 
The terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 marked the beginning of a new era 
in the international system and was responsible for a large change in policy regarding 
Taiwan. In the aftermath of the attack, the United States and many of its allies had a new 
enemy: terrorism, which was neither easily identifiable nor easy to eliminate. The War on 
Terror, which was begun by George W. Bush shortly after 911, sought to defeat terrorism 
wherever it might exist. This monumental task required a lot of resources and 
commitment for the United States and its allies. Before the attacks, the US wanted to 
begin to have an increased presence in Asia, but due to the attacks the US had to change 
their overall foreign policy strategy and focus on the Middle East, where the terrorist 
threat is mostly located. This change in emphasis forced the United States to change their 
policy towards China because they now needed China's assistance in the War on Terror. 
The United States has attempted to use China as a point of leverage against countries 
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vital in the War on Terrorism, such as Iran and Pakistan.lxxxi  
  This new focus on terrorism pertains to the Taiwan-China conflict for a number of 
reasons. The United States recognizes that in today's post-911 international system, an 
unstable Taiwan-China conflict is not in their best interests.lxxxii In regards to China the 
cooperation between the US and the PRC has been limited; however the tone and context 
of counterterrorism has helped stabilize and transform the bilateral relationship.lxxxiii 
Because of these external limits placed upon the United States, the two presidents 
following the 911 attacks have had to alter their policy to ensure that the conflict remains 
stable so that it does not compromise other foreign policy interest. A consequence of the 
US insistence of China's help on the War on Terror is that the United States cannot take 
such an aggressive stance in supporting Taiwan.  
  The attacks on September 11th 2001 help illuminate some of the causes that led to 
changes and continuities between Clinton and Bush administrations. For Clinton, he did 
not govern in the new international system, and as a result he was not limited in his 
foreign policy options in regards to Taiwan. Clinton likely could not have acted as 
aggressively in the Taiwan Crisis of 1995-96. Such an action in today's international 
system would not just have potentially destructive consequences for the US-China 
relationship but also towards the status of the War on Terror. Clinton did not usually have 
a heated relationship with China, and as a result an aggressive policy towards China in 
regards to the Taiwan conflict was more open than for the subsequent two presidents. 
  The attacks on September 11th had an administration altering affect on the Bush 
presidency, which subsequently led to a change in policy towards Taiwan. As mentioned 
before, President Bush changed his outlook on foreign policy and began to view the 
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international system as a battleground for good vs. evil. President Bush's foreign policy is 
often defined by his actions to combat the War on Terror. As such, this new priority 
changed his stance on the Taiwan conflict. Bush started his administration with an 
aggressive hawkish policy towards China. However, following 911 Bush began to follow 
Clinton's lead in regards to China. He proceeded to approach the Taiwan situation with 
care and caution.lxxxiv Bush no longer adamantly defended Taiwan because he did not 
wish to antagonize China nor endanger the stability of the area. Therefore, the relative 
continuity between Clinton and Bush's later policies can be partially explained by the 
events of September 11, 2001.  
  Some of president Obama's continuities with the Bush administration are also 
attributable to the post-911 international system. Obama must attend to many of the same 
issues that the Bush administration dealt with in the new global order. Like President 
Bush, Obama must attempt keep the conflict stable because of other foreign policy 
interests involving China and terrorism. As mentioned before Obama to a large extent has 
tried to maintain the balance in the region and in the relationship with China. Despite 
this, one must note that the US desire to appease China after 911 is still sometimes not 
greater than the obligation to fulfill the TRA. After the announcement of the 2010 arms 
deal with Taiwan, China repeatedly expressed its displeasure with the deal. China's 
response has been some of the strongest in years and they stated that if the US approved 
the new deal that cooperation between the two countries would suffer.lxxxv Despite the 
consequences for the War on Terror and US-China cooperation, Obama still proceeded 
with the deal. This illustrates that the post-911 realities that often force the US to appease 
China do not always exist.  
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Power Relations Between the United States and China   
The US relationship with the PRC and its impact on US policy in regards to the 
War on Terrorism helps to illuminate a larger issue: the new power relations between the 
United States and China. The changing nature of the relationship has significantly 
contributed to continuities in policies between the presidents, but more often it has forced 
the three presidents to update and change their policy. China's rise over the past two 
decades has shifted the international system and as such the acting president must 
sufficiently deal with this. China has drastically progressed both its economy and its 
military capabilities in this time. As a consequence of this progress China might 
eventually change the international order from a unipolar to a bipolar or multipolar 
system. In response to this and China's progress the US has changed the nature of its 
interaction with China. In many ways the US has tried to improve relations with China. 
However, there is a growing fear of a rising China in the US thus the US has often 
become more hostile towards to China. These shifts have had a profound impact on the 
Taiwan conflict. The United States now must balance its interests with a rising China 
with its interests towards Taiwan. Therefore a large part of both the continuities and 
changes between the three administration can be attributed to power relations between the 
United States and China.  
Economic Aspect of Power Relationship  
In regards to the economy this power shift is one of the main reasons why US 
policy towards Taiwan has undergone significant changes since the dawn of the Clinton 
administration. Since the Clinton administration the economic growth of China has 
drastically increased as illustrated in the Graph 4.0.  
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Graph 4.0 
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An economically rising China has had a significant impact on the United States. As a 
result of the substantial economic growth, China has begun to buy US Treasury Holdings 
as indicated by the Graph 5.0. 
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With this increased debt, the United States cannot afford to antagonize China too much 
and risk an economic backlash. Along with the massive debt that the US has towards 
China, another key economic factor is the appreciation of Chinese currency. The United 
States feels that China's RMB has been undervalued for some time and that is negatively 
impacting the US economy. This sentiment in the US has led to anti-China rhetoric 
among US politicians and among the public. This then leads to calls for a tougher stance 
on China in general. As a result this sentiment spills into the Taiwan conflict and 
therefore the politicians become more supportive of Taiwan. 
  For President Clinton the economic relationship between the US and China 
played an important role in the formulation of policy towards Taiwan, but the impact was 
not as significant as it would become in the subsequent administrations. As illustrated in 
the Graph 4.0, China had not become an economic superpower when Clinton took office. 
China had just begun to rise but it did not command the influence that it does now. As for 
the debt during the Clinton administration, it was not a major issue that affected his 
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policy towards China and Taiwan. Similar to the systemic factors related to a pre-911 
international order, Clinton was not limited in his options towards China. For example he 
could afford to escalate the situation as he did in 1995-96 without dire economic 
consequences.  
  President Bush on the other hand had to balance the United States' economic 
interests in his policies toward Taiwan, and as a result his policies towards China had to 
change from Clinton’s administration. During his administration China emerged as an 
economic superpower. As noted in the Graph 5.0, during his presidency US debt to China 
skyrocketed. This increased debt placed pressure on Bush and he could not take an 
aggressive pro-Taiwan stance without angering China. This external constraint on his 
policies helps explain his shifting policy towards Taiwan during his tenure. When the 
debt to China was not too massive he could afford to utilize a hawkish foreign policy 
towards China in regards to the Taiwan conflict. However, as his presidency progressed 
the debt became more significant and prominent. Bush could not maintain his aggressive 
Chinese policy without economic consequences. Thus, this helps explain his 
administration's policy shift towards an engagement-oriented strategy with regards to 
China in the conflict.  
  Bush had to shift his policy due to the debt; however there were internal pressures 
on him maintaining an aggressive anti-China policy because of the evaluation of the 
RMB. The RMB evaluation has become a prevalent issue among many politicians in the 
US. Strong anti-China sentiment has emerged because of this evaluation and this likely 
contributes toward the continuing trend of the US Congress opposing China on issues 
such as Taiwan. Because of these domestic views against China, Bush cannot become too 
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friendly with China without some political backlash. Therefore this partially contributes 
to the answer of why Bush did not try to fully appease the Chinese in regards to the 
Taiwan-China conflict. 
  These economic factors have been largely influential in Obama continuing the 
policy trends of George Bush. The economic rise of China has not stagnated during 
Obama's two years as president. China still possesses large quantities of the US debt. As 
of 2009 China holds about $1 trillion of the US's $10 trillion debt.lxxxviii The issue of the 
RMB and the detrimental affect it has on sentiment towards China has continued. 
Another key economic component for the Obama administration is that the US is willing 
to manage China's recent economic rise but it does not want China to become an 
economic hegemony in the area.lxxxix As of result of these economic conditions and 
strategies Obama faces the same internal and external pressures when formulating policy 
towards Taiwan. Therefore these factors partially explain why Obama has continued 
Bush's later policies of engaging China while maintaining close ties with Taiwan.  
Military Aspect of Power Relationship 
The military aspect of the power relationship between the US and China is one of the 
most important reasons for why there are both changes and continuities in US policies. 
Increased military capabilities between the two countries have played a fundamental role 
in developing a policy towards Taiwan for each of the three presidents. China has 
upgraded its military since the beginning of the Clinton administration; however this 
increased military is still punitive compared to the US military.  
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Graph 6.0
(Graph from Professor Kang)
Graph 6.0  shows that despite a 21% increase in military expenditures, China still 
significantly lags behind the US. 
expenditures and the rest of the world including China. 
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This military superiority has given each administration more options when dealing with 
China. The US recognizes that with a superior military it can deter China from invading 
Taiwan. 
  Despite this massive military advantage for the US, the worry is that China will 
develop capabilities to attack Taiwan and prevent the US from successfully intervening. 
For the last three administrations China has not attacked Taiwan; however there are 
suspicions that if their nonviolent means of coercing Taiwan fail to work they might try 
to use force. A 2009 Congressional Report indicates that China recently has upgraded 
their military to fight short duration conflicts.xcii This recent buildup in short duration 
military arms is likely implemented so that China can neutralize Taiwan’s defense before 
the US could successfully intervene.xciii This remains important because if China decided 
to attack Taiwan their goal would be a quick and swift takeover of the island. Therefore 
this recent buildup only reaffirms the fear that China could try to quickly take over 
Taiwan with minimal to no military involvement from the US.  
  For President Clinton, the military relationship played a significant role in 
developing his policy towards Taiwan. Because of the US's military superiority, he could 
risk deploying navy ships during the 1995-96 crisis. This was a symbolic military act that 
showed that the US was serious about preventing China from bullying Taiwan. The threat 
of US intervention probably lowered the risk. Rationally China understands that if a war 
occurred the US would likely be victorious because of their military superiority. 
Therefore this illustrates that during Clinton's presidency the superior military 
capabilities of the US helped play an important role in his policy of maintaining the status 
quo and stability in the conflict.  
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  For President Bush, the military power relationship between the US and China 
also played an important role in developing his stronger stance towards China from 
Clinton. When Bush tried to take a hard-line stance on China in the beginning of his 
presidency he could afford to take such a stance because of his country's military 
advantage. His "strategic clarity" defense position had to be taken seriously by the 
Chinese because of the superiority the US enjoyed militarily. Just as in Clinton's case, 
Bush's military advantage and commitment to Taiwan likely deterred the Chinese from 
taking any violent drastic measures against Taiwan because of the risk of the US 
retaliating. Bush strived to maintain the status quo of the situation like Clinton. The 
military superiority that he enjoyed during his presidency allowed him to succeed in this 
regards. 
  Since the military advantage of the US has not wavered in the Obama 
administration, Obama has had success in continuing the policies of Bush and 
maintaining the status quo. Because the military disparity between the two remains, albeit 
to a lesser degree, the deterrence factor of the US military still exists. It aids the Obama 
administration just like it did during the Clinton and Bush administrations. The recent 
buildup for China could potentially change the status quo in the future though because 
China is developing weapons that could prevent the US from helping Taiwan. The 
Chinese buildup for a possible war with Taiwan reaffirms the notion that the US and 
Taiwan must continue to amount a defense policy. Therefore, this need partially explains 
why Obama continued the policy of following the TRA and even helps exhibits why he 
signed such a massive arms deal with Taiwan. Although Obama is obliged by the TRA to 
sell arms to Taiwan, it is unlikely that the US would engage in such a large military arms 
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deal with Taiwan if China did not present a serious military threat considering the 
adverse effects it had on US-China relations. Thus the military power relationship 
between the US, China, and Taiwan has played a substantial role in the formulation of 
policy for Obama.  
 Taiwanese Politics  
The ideologies of the Chinese and Taiwanese government have important 
implications for the US in the decision-making process, and as such their actions have 
had an important impact on changes in policies between the presidents. China has 
undergone individual changes in regards to their leadership since the dawn of the Clinton 
administration; however their stance towards Taiwan has not significantly wavered. Since 
China's government is a one-party system, the same party with the same ideology has 
remained in power. Taiwan on the other hand has gone through significant political 
changes that have affected their outlook on the conflict. The two major parties in Taiwan, 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Koumintang (KMT), have different 
ideologies regarding how to approach the conflict. The KMT supports a "One China" 
policy while the DPP advocates Taiwan becoming a separate entity from China.xciv The 
ideologies of the two major parties have had a large amount of influence on each of the 
three presidents. 
  For most of President Clinton’s tenure, Taiwan was ruled by President Lee and 
the KMT party. This had important implications in Clinton’s policies towards Taiwan. 
Lee was a member of the more conciliatory KMT, yet he still managed to escalate the 
situation with China. The most notable examples include his trip to the US that spawned 
the 1995-96 crisis and his statements in 1999 in which he said Taiwan and China should 
45 
 
be on a "special state-to-state" basis.xcv This statement implied that Taiwan was a separate 
state from China and resulted in another military display similar to the one in 1995-96 by 
the Chinese. These two incidents put Clinton in a tough position in which he had to 
respond. Since Clinton wanted to utilize an ambiguous policy towards Taiwan, these two 
international incidents forced him to take a definitive position regarding the conflict. 
Thus this illustrates that the political makeup and leadership of Taiwan affected Clinton’s 
policy. 
  The political atmosphere during Bush's presidency also influenced his policies, 
and forced Bush to change his policies to one that required him to sometimes shy away 
from strong pro-Taiwan rhetoric. During Bush's administration the DPP came into power. 
The leader of the Republic of Taiwan from 2000-2008, President Chen, worried both the 
Chinese and the Bush administration. Bush saw the president as a troublemakerxcvi while 
the Chinese regarded him as an envelope pusher and a risk taker.xcvii Cross strait dialogue 
between Taiwan and China beyond seeking detente did not exist during Chen's 
tenure.xcviii This had important implications for the policies of Bush because Chen added 
extra tensions to an already volatile conflict. Through his strong separatist statements 
Chen caused tensions between the US and Taiwan. Chen's referendum for independence 
in 2004 put the Bush administration in the unique position of criticizing the Taiwanese 
while defending the Chinese.xcix Other similar problems with the Chen administration 
would occur which influenced Bush's new direction of more engagement with China. 
Therefore this illustrates that Chen's controversial leadership partially influenced Bush's 
shift away from a strong Taiwanese position. 
  The new leadership of Taiwan has also had important implications for the Obama 
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administration and his ability to continue the policies of Bush. In 2008 the KMT took 
over and Ma Ying-Jeou became president. The new Taiwanese administration is more 
Beijing friendly than the Chen administration. As such this has eased tensions in the 
conflict. Obama has not been forced to deal with strong separatist language and the 
external constraints on policy formulation that accompany it. The effect of this is that it 
has not constrained or forced Obama to act a specific way. Therefore the new political 
leadership is favorable for Obama and his ability to formulate the policies that he desired.  
Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 There are many factors that contribute to the final outcomes for each president, 
however some of these aspects explained are more significant than others. The individual 
level dynamics are not as influential as some of the other aspects. The president’s 
personality and leadership style act as a template for the decision-making process, but it 
does not guarantee nor fully explain how the president will act. The president is 
constrained by many other internal and external factors that reduce the impact of the 
president’s personality, morality, and ideological beliefs on decisions regarding Taiwan. 
However, these factors still offer important insights into the three presidents’ grand 
foreign policy plan towards Taiwan. 
 Some state-level factors are not as significant as others. Congress has an 
important constraining influence on the president, yet it still fails to consistently push its 
agenda on Taiwan. Congress is overwhelmingly supportive of Taiwan yet each of the 
presidents has not enacted a foreign policy that fits within the ideology of Congress as a 
whole. Congress has had some success in policy formulation, for example during the 
1995-96 crisis, and it has successfully constrained the executive branch from straying too 
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far from a pro-Taiwan stance. Thus Congress is not as important as other factors; 
however it still plays a relatively significant role in ensuring the continuation of a pro-
Taiwan strategy between the three presidents. 
 Taiwan and Chinese lobbyists also have had an impact on the continuation of 
policy between each president; however, this influence is less than all other factors 
examined. The United States Congress takes into account the Taiwan lobbyists, yet 
Congress can only act so much. Chinese lobbyists have little to no influence in Congress, 
and in certain cases they have actually increased sympathy towards Taiwan. The overall 
lack of a unified position has also diminished the influence of the lobbyists. These factors 
illustrate that the lobbyists do not have the same influence as other aspects of the three-
level analysis. 
 The military industrial complex remains one of the most important factors in 
understanding the continuities between the presidents. Each president has authorized 
arms deals in part because of the massive influence that the military industrial complex 
has. The large military corporations have spent substantial amounts of money and have 
become integrated in the decision-making process. The military industry also has 
important functions within the government because of its impact on trade and the 
domestic economy. As such the government often takes into account their lobbying. Even 
though there are two conflicting treaties over arms selling and the Chinese adamantly 
oppose such trading, the United States still continues to sell massive amounts of military 
equipment. This thus illustrates the enormous impact that the military industrial complex 
has on policy formulation.  
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 Systemic factors also play a substantial role in each of the presidents’ decision-
making process and help explain both the changes and continuities between the 
presidents. Because of the external constraints brought upon by 911 and China’s 
economic and military rise, the presidents have had to shift and change their policy. The 
president must act rationally within the realities of the international system. On the other 
hand, the enormous advantage that the US has in military capabilities has increased the 
options in which each president can utilize. As such, all three presidents can continue the 
overarching policy of maintaining a peaceful status quo because of the deterrence factor 
of the US military. The political realities of Taiwan are also important in why each 
president has acted in the ways that they do. The political ideologies of the Taiwanese 
government have had significant consequences that have altered the intensity of the 
conflict and thus the policy that the president pursues.  
 The Taiwan-China conflict remains one of the most potentially destructive 
international situations. If the conflict escalates into a shooting war, there are many 
unknowns that could destabilize not only Eastern Asia, but the entire international 
system. Relations between the three main actors involved have improved; however the 
conflict is far from resolved. The rise of China does not seem to be slowing and as a 
result the nature of the conflict could easily change in the future. As such in order to 
understand the future, US decision-makers need to recognize on all three levels why the 
US has continued yet changed many aspects of its policy towards Taiwan. This will allow 
the current and future leaders of the US to more adequately understand the nature of the 
conflict, which will therefore reduce the risk of the conflict boiling over into a heated 
conflict.  
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